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LLC and Partnership Transfer Restrictions Excluded From UCC Article 9 Overrides
Abstract
The organizational law of limited liability companies (LLCs) and partnerships has always fundamentally
embraced an idea known as the “pick-your-partner principle,” under which transfers of a member’s or
partner’s ownership interest are restricted by statute, and those restrictions may be tightened or loosened
by agreement. In recent years the pick-your-partner principle has interacted in complex and not always
practical ways with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Since 2001, UCC §§ 9-406 and
9-408 have overridden a broad range of statutory and agreement-based anti-assignment provisions,
subject to complex exceptions that have tended to protect the pick-your-partner principle in many
significant respects, while also proving analytically very difficult to handle. Recently, however, in an
important step forward, Article 9’s overrides of anti-assignment provisions have been amended to make
them simply inapplicable to LLC and partnership interests.
One hopes that these amendments to Article 9’s overrides (hereinafter the “2018 amendments” because
they were approved last year) will soon be enacted by the states, but in the meantime, the current
overrides will remain on the books in various jurisdictions with all of their existing complexities.
Accordingly, this article focuses not only on the 2018 amendments, but also on an analysis of the
overrides as they now stand, as applied to LLC and partnership interests. The amendments themselves
are quite simple, but the article discusses them only after analyzing the overrides because the
amendments are more easily understood against that background.
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LLC and Partnership Transfer Restrictions
Excluded From UCC Article 9 Overrides
By: Carl S. Bjerre, Daniel S. Kleinberger, Edwin E. Smith, Steven O. Weise *
The organizational law of limited liability companies (LLCs) and partnerships has always
fundamentally embraced an idea known as the “pick-your-partner principle,” under which
transfers of a member’s or partner’s ownership interest are restricted by statute, and those
restrictions may be tightened or loosened by agreement. In recent years the pick-your-partner
principle has interacted in complex and not always practical ways with Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC). Since 2001, UCC §§ 9-406 and 9-408 have overridden a broad range of
statutory and agreement-based anti-assignment provisions, subject to complex exceptions that
have tended to protect the pick-your-partner principle in many significant respects, while also
proving analytically very difficult to handle. Recently, however, in an important step forward,
Article 9’s overrides of anti-assignment provisions have been amended to make them simply
inapplicable to LLC and partnership interests.
One hopes that these amendments to Article 9’s overrides (hereinafter the “2018
amendments” because they were approved last year) will soon be enacted by the states, but in
the meantime, the current overrides will remain on the books in various jurisdictions with all of
their existing complexities. Accordingly, this article focuses not only on the 2018 amendments,
but also on an analysis of the overrides as they now stand, as applied to LLC and partnership
interests. The amendments themselves are quite simple, but the article discusses them only
after analyzing the overrides because the amendments are more easily understood against that
background.

I. Background on Unincorporated Organization Law and UCC Article 9
Any co-owner of a privately held business organization may have a substantial stake in
determining who the other co-owners are. If a second co-owner has the power to transfer its
interest to a stranger, then the second co-owner can, in effect, force the first co-owner into a
venture with the stranger/transferee without the first co-owner’s consent. The policy and
effect of the pick-your-partner principle under LLC and partnership law is to prevent such an
outcome.
UCC Article 9, by contrast, has the very different policy orientation of facilitating voluntary
transfers of personal property. Article 9’s most familiar application is to transfers of property as
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security for the repayment of loans, but Article 9 also applies to outright sales of certain types
of personal property. Some of these transfers and outright sales are precisely those that the
pick-your-partner principle seeks to prevent, and as a result, for personal property consisting of
LLC or partnership interests, the interaction of the pick-your-partner principle with Article 9 has
been complex and thorny. Some have even called it recondite.
Ownership interests in a business organization, particularly one that is unincorporated, can be
formally or informally bifurcated into governance rights and economic (or financial) rights.
Governance rights consist of the owner’s right to vote on, consent to, or otherwise make
decisions about the organization’s activities, and the right to receive information about the
organization. Economic rights consist of the owner’s entitlement to receive monetary
distributions from the organization, whether from its profits or from an eventual dissolution
and winding up. A complete ownership interest typically comprises both governance rights and
economic rights. A good example of purely economic rights is a transferable interest in an LLC
or limited partnership. See, e.g., Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) § 102(24)
(2013).
Article 9 broadly covers ordinary security interests in both of the above aspects of ownership
rights as well as in virtually all other personal property, plus the outright sales of some types of
personal property, to be explained below. In light of this vast coverage, and in order to provide
appropriately tailored rules for particular patterns of transaction, Article 9 subdivides personal
property into an array of statutorily defined “types,” or classifications. The most important
classification for purposes of this article is general intangibles, which is Article 9’s residual or
catch-all classification, meaning that it includes any personal property that does not fall within
the other Article 9 classifications. Hence, an asset is a general intangible only if it is not, for
example, inventory or other goods, accounts, instruments, chattel paper, or securities or other
investment property. See UCC § 9-102(a)(42). Examples of general intangibles range from
trademarks to taxicab medallions, and centrally for purposes of this article, the category
includes most LLC and partnership interests. (LLC or partnership interests may alternatively be
classified as securities, using an opt-in process discussed in Part II.C.)
The other key type of property for purposes of this article is payment intangibles, which is a
subset of general intangibles. The distinction between a general intangible that is also a
payment intangible on one hand, and a general intangible that is not a payment intangible on
the other, is that the former includes only general intangibles under which the “principal
obligation” of the “account debtor” is “a monetary obligation.” § 9-102(a)(62). In this article,
the important term “account debtor” may be understood simply as the entity that is obligated
on a payment intangible or other general intangible, i.e., the LLC or partnership itself as
opposed to its members or partners. To determine whether the “principal obligation” is
“monetary,” one must weigh the relative importance of a member’s or partner’s governance
and economic rights: if the LLC’s or partnership’s principal obligation in respect of the
ownership interest is economic and thus “monetary,” then the ownership interest is a general
intangible that is also a payment intangible (or simply “payment intangible” for short).
Otherwise, the ownership interest is a general intangible that is not a payment intangible. In

general, if a member or partner has governance rights that the LLC or partnership is obligated
to respect, the ownership interest is likely a general intangible that is not a payment intangible.
This distinction between payment intangibles and other general intangibles affects Article 9’s
scope, which is crucial to understanding the overrides because of course the overrides apply
only within that scope. Article 9’s scope includes two principal types of transactions relevant to
this article: interests in either payment intangibles or other general intangibles that secure a
loan or another obligation (referred to in this article as ordinary security interests), and outright
sales of payment intangibles. In fact, outright sales of payment intangibles are statutorily
defined in Article 9 as “security interests,” purely as a matter of terminological convenience,
because many (though not all) of Article 9’s rules for ordinary security interests also apply
directly to sales of payment intangibles. By contrast, Article 9’s scope does not include outright
sales of general intangibles that are not payment intangibles, because most of such sales have
little enough in common with ordinary security interests that inclusion would not be sensible.
(The boundary between an outright sale of property and an ordinary security interest in the
property is not always self-evident, but that topic is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., §
9-109 cmt. 4.) One final note on Article 9’s scope is that transfers by gift or, generally, transfers
by operation of law are not covered.
Bringing these strands together, Article 9 typically does not apply at all to the most common
kind of transfer in this area—namely, outright sales of a member’s or partner’s complete
ownership interest—because such a transaction is typically the sale of a general intangible that
is not a payment intangible. By the same token, Article 9 does not apply to outright sales of a
member’s or partner’s governance rights alone. But Article 9 does apply, and hence its
overrides discussed below might apply, to ordinary security interests in complete ownership
interests; to ordinary security interests in economic rights alone; and to outright sales of
economic rights alone.
The fact that Article 9 applies to a particular transaction, though, does not necessarily mean
that there is a practical conflict between an Article 9 override and the pick-your-partner
principle. Whether a practical conflict exists depends on three elements. First, do the applicable
statutes governing the organization directly restrict transfers? Such restrictions are universal or
nearly so in the case of governance rights and complete ownership interests (e.g., ULLCA §
407(b)(2) (2013)), but they are nonexistent or nearly so in the case of economic rights (e.g., id. §
502(a)). Second, do the LLC’s or partnership’s own organic documents alter (or perhaps track)
the statutory law just mentioned, for example by restricting transfers of economic rights?
Organizations may indeed adopt restrictions on the transfer of economic rights, in order to
ensure that all owners retain their economic stake in the organization and, as a result, have
reasonably well-aligned governance incentives. And finally, if a restriction on transfer is
imposed by either of the foregoing sources, does one of the Article 9 overrides invalidate or
limit the restriction?

II. Navigating Unamended §§ 9-406 and 9-408
Part of what makes Article 9’s overrides of anti-assignment provisions difficult is that they
appear in two separate sections that are phrased quite similarly, but have subtle distinctions,
and do not overlap. The first override, in § 9-406, is relatively strong and simple in its effects,
but it applies to only a narrow set of transactions. The second override, in § 9-408, applies more
broadly and is more complex in its provisions that apply to LLC and partnership interests, but it
has only relatively weak effects on the transactions to which it applies. Taking into account the
narrowness of the first and the weakness of the second, plus the availability of the opt-in
process discussed in Part II.C, the overrides have generally not posed substantial problems for
those who seek the protection of the pick-your-partner principle. On the other hand, general
conclusions only take one so far in particular transactions.

A. Section 9-406

Article 9’s first override, beginning at § 9-406(d), invalidates any “term in an agreement
between an account debtor and an assignor” to the extent that that term “prohibits, restricts,
or requires the consent of . . . the account debtor” to “the assignment or transfer of, or the
creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in . . . the payment
intangible.” The simplicity of this provision is evident from its shortness, and the strength of this
provision is that it overrides restrictions on all aspects of security interests, including
“enforcement,” as further discussed below.
The § 9-406 override is narrow, however, in three important ways. First, it applies only to
payment intangibles (leaving aside its application to other types of property not relevant to this
article), and only to ordinary security interests in them. See § 9-406(e). In other words, the
override does not apply to transfers of governance rights, in either an outright sale or an
ordinary security interest; and it does not apply to transfers of a complete ownership interest in
either an outright sale or an ordinary security interest, assuming that the complete ownership
interest is a general intangible that is not a payment intangible. Nor does the override apply to
an outright sale of a payment intangible (other than a foreclosure sale or a secured party’s
acceptance of the payment intangible in satisfaction of the obligation it secures). See the
discussion of § 9-408 in Part II.B. The narrowness of the § 9-406 override is important as a
practical matter because when an LLC’s or partnership’s organic documents impose restrictions
on transfer, the restrictions sometimes apply by their own terms only to governance rights or
complete ownership interests, not to purely economic rights (classified as payment intangibles)
in the first place.
Second, the § 9-406 override has no effect on an anti-assignment clause in an agreement
among the organization’s members or partners inter se, as opposed to terms in an agreement
with the organization itself. This is because the override applies only to terms in an agreement
with “an account debtor” and the assignor/transferor, and as noted in Part I, the LLC or
partnership itself, rather than the other members or partners, is the account debtor in this
context. Moreover, there may be substantial grounds to question whether the override applies
even to an anti-assignment clause that is set forth directly in the organization’s operating

agreement, partnership agreement or other organic documents, because as a formal matter, an
LLC or partnership is usually not a party to these agreements. On the other hand, substanceover-form arguments should be borne in mind on this point.
Third and relatedly, if the term of the agreement imposes a consent requirement, the override
applies only if the consent required is that of the LLC or partnership itself, as opposed to one or
more members or partners. For example, if an LLC is member-managed, the agreement will
almost certainly require the consent of the members, and accordingly, the override will not
apply to that requirement.

B. Section 9-408

Article 9’s other override, beginning at § 9-408(a), invalidates any term in “an agreement
between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to . . . a general intangible” that
“prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of . . . the account debtor” to “the assignment or
transfer of, or creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in . . . the . . . general
intangible.” It also invalidates any provision of a statute or other rule of law that similarly
“prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of . . . [an] account debtor” to “the assignment or
transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, a . . . general intangible.” Thus § 9-408 is more
complex than § 9-406 as applied to LLC and partnership interests, because it overrides not only
terms of agreements, but also statutes or other rules of law. (Although § 9-406 also overrides
some statutes or other rules of law, it does so only for classifications of collateral that are not
relevant to this article.)
Section 9-408 is also broader than § 9-406 in two additional ways. First, it applies to a broader
range of transactions, namely outright sales of payment intangibles (statutorily included in
Article 9’s term “security interest,” as noted in Part I) and ordinary security interests in general
intangibles that are not payment intangibles. Outright sales of economic rights, covered here,
perhaps are more common than ordinary security interests in them, covered in §9-406; and
certainly general intangibles that are not payment intangibles is the most common classification
of an LLC or partnership interest.
Second, the statutes that § 9-408 overrides are of broad applicability because they are
restrictions on the transfer of general intangibles that are not payment intangibles, i.e., virtually
all complete ownership interests, plus all governance rights taken alone. As a practical matter,
such statutory restrictions are nearly universal in this area, though a particular organization’s
organic documents may sometimes alter the statutory default rules.
On the other hand, just as for § 9-406 above, § 9-408 does not apply to an anti-assignment
clause in an agreement among the organization’s members or partners inter se, as opposed to
an agreement with the organization itself. Similarly, and again just as for § 9-406, if the term of
the agreement imposes a consent requirement, § 9-408 applies only if the consent required is
that of the organization itself, as opposed to one or more members or partners. This override of
consent requirements, in § 9-408 unlike § 9-406, extends to statutes as well as terms in an
agreement, but nonetheless only if the consent required is that of the organization itself as

opposed to one or more members or partners—but this is not how the LLC and partnership
statutes work. Instead, the statutes place the power to give or withhold consent in the hands of
the members or partners themselves.
The feature of this override that makes its effects relatively weak, and thereby substantially
accommodates parties seeking the protection of the pick-your-partner principle, is that § 9-408
invalidates restrictions only on the “creation, attachment, or perfection” of security interests. It
does not, unlike § 9-406, invalidate restrictions on “enforcement” of security interests.
Subsection 9-408(d) amplifies on this point by specifying among other things that, even giving
effect to the § 9-408 override, a security interest that is subject to an otherwise enforceable
restriction is “not enforceable” against the “account debtor” (i.e., the LLC or partnership itself),
and “does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest.” In other words, under
§ 9-408, a security interest (including an outright sale of a payment intangible) may go forward
as between the transferor and transferee, but not as between the transferee and the LLC or
partnership. The secured party acquires property rights (an ordinary security interest or an
ownership interest) to the transferring member’s or partner’s ownership interest, and the value
of these rights would be respected, for example in a bankruptcy of the transferor, or as applied
to proceeds from a transfer not affected by a restriction. See UCC § 9-408 cmt. 7. But the
secured party is nonetheless without power of its own to step into the transferor’s shoes and
exercise the transferor’s governance or economic rights.
Summarizing the substance of the two overrides, it is useful to think in terms of four
permutations, based on the two classifications of collateral and the two forms of transaction.
First, an outright sale of a general intangible that is not a payment intangible is not within the
scope of Article 9, so neither override applies. Second, with an ordinary security interest in a
general intangible that is not a payment intangible, the relatively weak override in § 9-408
applies, so that the secured party cannot enforce the transferred governance or economic
rights against the organization. Third, with an outright sale of a payment intangible, again the
relatively weak override in § 9-408 applies, so that the secured party cannot enforce the
transferred rights against the organization. And fourth, with an ordinary security interest in a
payment intangible, the relatively strong override in § 9-406 applies, so that the secured party
can enforce the transferred rights against the organization. The Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code (P.E.B.) is considering issuing a report that would further detail
the application of both overrides to LLC and partnership interests.

C. Opting into Article 8

Neither of the Article 9 overrides applies to property that is a security as defined in UCC Article
8. This is because securities are classified by Article 9 as “investment property” rather than as
general intangibles or, a fortiori, payment intangibles.
The term “security” generally does not include ownership interests in LLCs and partnerships,
but it does include them if the “terms” of the ownership interest “expressly provide that it is a
security” governed by Article 8. See §§ 8-102(a)(15), 8-103(c). Hence, one established way for

transactional lawyers to avoid the overrides altogether is to have the organization “opt in” to
Article 8 by adopting appropriate provisions in its organic documents. Related measures include
providing for the security to be certificated or uncertificated, and preventing the organization
from opting back out of Article 8 without the consent of the parties concerned.

III. The 2018 Amendments, Non-Uniform Amendments, and Choice of
Law
Compared to the complex analysis in Part II, enactment of the 2018 amendments will markedly
simplify the law in this area, eliminating the possible conflicts with the pick-your-partner
principle that can remain despite the exceptions in §§ 9-406 and 9-408, and without the need
for an Article 8 opt-in.
The 2018 amendments statutorily provide that Article 9’s overrides do not apply to “a security
interest in an ownership interest in a general partnership, limited partnership, or limited
liability company.” (In § 9-406, this language appears in a new subsection (k), which explicitly
applies to subsections (d), (f), and (j). In § 9-408, the same language appears in a new
subsection (f), which explicitly applies to the entire section.) A new comment to § 9-408 reads:
This section does not apply to an ownership interest in a limited liability
company, limited partnership, or general partnership, regardless of the name
of the interest and whether the interest: (i) pertains to economic rights,
governance rights, or both; (ii) arises under: (a) an operating agreement, the
applicable limited liability company act, or both; or (b) a partnership
agreement, the applicable partnership act, or both; or (iii) is owned by: (a) a
member of a company or transferee or assignee of a member; or (b) a partner
or a transferee or assignee of a partner; or (iv) comprises contractual,
property, other rights, or some combination thereof.
A new comment to § 9-406 provides that the § 9-408 comment applies to § 9-406 as well.
By excluding from the overrides a “security interest” in an ownership interest, when other
law prevents outright sales of payment intangibles, ordinary security interests in payment
intangibles, or ordinary security interests in general intangibles from going forward (and the
relevant property is an ownership interest), Article 9 does not interfere with the effect of that
other law. On the other hand, the overrides remain in effect (so that transfers continue to be
enabled) for general intangibles that are not LLC or partnership interests and for other
classifications of personal property that are not relevant to this article.
The 2018 amendments were initially recommended by the P.E.B. in conjunction with
representatives from the Joint Editorial Board on Uniform Unincorporated Organization Acts.
They were then approved in accordance with the respective procedures of the UCC’s two
sponsoring organizations, the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission. As a
result, they are now a part of the UCC’s official text.

At the time of this writing, it is too early for the 2018 amendments to have been enacted in any
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in recent years a number of states, led by Delaware, have
enacted non-uniform provisions having the same thrust. Some of the non-uniform provisions
appear in the enacting states’ UCC; others appear in their LLC and partnership organizational
statutes; and others appear in both spots, as belt and suspenders and to ensure they will be
found.
An important conflict-of-laws question can arise if a transaction involves elements from more
than one jurisdiction, one of which has the unamended Article 9 overrides, and another of
which has an eventual enactment of the 2018 amendments (or an existing, comparable nonuniform provision). Article 9’s conflicts rule for perfection and priority of security interests in
general intangibles does not apply to the treatment of transfer restrictions, because this issue is
neither “perfection,” “the effect of perfection or nonperfection,” nor “priority.” See § 9-301(1).
Article 1’s main catch-all conflicts rule, which leaves some conflicts questions to the agreement
of the parties, would also generally be inappropriate here because transfer restrictions
inherently present a three-party question that is not amenable to treatment by two-party
agreement. See § 1-301(a). Accordingly, a choice-of-law clause in the security agreement or
other agreement between transferor and transferee does not control, as Comment 3 to § 9-401
makes clear. Instead, one would hope that a court would apply the version of the overrides
enacted by the jurisdiction in which the entity is organized, as the same Comment assumes.
(The “internal affairs” doctrine in business entity law would also be consistent with such an
outcome, although of course, restrictions on transfers to nonmembers or nonpartners are not
strictly internal affairs issues.) In any case, the bottom line is that real certainty in this area will
most promisingly have to come from broad enactment of the 2018 amendments. The members
of each state’s Uniform Law Commission delegation can often be of direct help in those
enactment efforts.

IV. Conclusion
The 2018 amendments will protect the pick-your-partner principle while also greatly simplifying
and clarifying its interactions with Article 9. By the same token, as is often true of simple rules,
the 2018 amendments may also sometimes reach more broadly than really needed, for
example by preventing simple attachment and perfection, without enforcement, of a security
interest in a complete ownership interest. However, those transactions can continue to go
forward despite the 2018 amendments by means of, for example, the Article 8 opt-in, or other
amendment or waiver of the organization’s organic documents. On balance, the gains in this
area from simplicity and clarity should clearly outweigh the losses from the occasional extra
burden to an Article 9 transaction.

